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IV 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
JESSE VALDEZ, 
Defendant/Appe llee. 
Case No. 20080946-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The State appeals the trial court's dismissal of two criminal charges: possession of 
a controlled substance in a drug-free zone and possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-
free zone. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (2008). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Issue: Whether the trial court correctly concluded that Officer Robertson's 
hearsay statement was unreliable under Rule 1102(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
because the officer did not sufficiently identify that the details of the search came from a 
fellow officer. 
Standard of Review: Whether statements are "reliable" under the Utah Rules of 
Evidence is a factual issue, which is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. See, 
State v. Alfred, 2002 UT App 291, t 10, 55 P.3d 1158, 1161; and State v. Parker, 2000 
UT5l,1fl3,4P.3d778,78l. 
2. Issue: Whether the trial court correctly declined to bind over the charges based on 
insufficient evidence. 
Standard of Review. "[T]he review of a bind over decision is based upon a 
correctness standcird ... [however,] the reviewing court should give some deference to a 
magistrate's factual findings." State v. Redd, 954 P.2d 230, 233-34 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998), rev'd on other grounds, State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, 992 P.2d 986, (citing State v. 
Wodskow, 896 P.2d 29, 31 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)); and State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29,1f 34, 
137P.3d787, 795. 
CONTROLLING CONSITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
All necessary constitutional and statutory provisions, as well as rules, are included in the 
Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In July, 2008, Jesse Valdez was charged by Information with: (1) Possession or 
Use of a Controlled Substance, a third-degree felony, under Utah Code § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i); and (2) Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, under Utah 
Code § 58-37a-5(l). (R. 2). Subsequently, the State amended the charges and alleged 
them to have taken place within a drug-free zone, which enhanced them by one degree. 
(R. 18). 
After hearing testimony during a Preliminary Hearing held on August 28, 2008, 
the Honorable James R. Taylor determined that the State failed to meet its burden of 
proof and did not bind over the charges. (R. 40: 16-17). The State filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration of Denial of Bindover or Request for Permission to Refile Charges on 
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September 9, 2008. (R. 27-20). On October 8, 2008, after consideration of the State's 
motion, the Honorable James R. Taylor reaffirmed that the testimony presented was not 
"'reliable hearsay' and ... was insufficient to meet the burden of proof required at a 
preliminary hearing." (R. 31). 
The State filed its Notice of Appeal on November 10, 2008. (R. 38). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Valdez was on supervised probation under the care of Agent Kirt Robinson of 
Adult Probation and Parole. (R. 40: 3). On July 12, 2008, at approximately 1 o'clock in 
the morning, Agent Robinson, assisted by Officers Barker and Wolcott, conducted a field 
visit to Defendant's home. (R. 40: 3). Robinson testified that he conducted the field visit 
based on information that Defendant sold methamphetamine passed from "various 
people" to local law enforcement agencies, which was subsequently passed to Robinson. 
(R. 40: 3-4). 
When the officers arrived to Defendant's residence - which was a shed located 
adjacent to his mother's mobile home - Robinson knocked on the door and Defendant 
answered. (R. 40: 4-5). Robinson asked if he could come in and Defendant consented. 
(R. 40: 5). Defendant was the only person in the home. (R. 40: 5). 
Once inside, Robinson informed Defendant of the allegation that he was selling 
methamphetamine and asked if there was any in the home or on his person. (R. 40: 5). 
Defendant denied selling methamphetamine. (R. 40: 5). Robinson searched Defendant 
and found nothing, then he searched the couch and found nothing. (R. 40: 5). Robinson 
then sat Defendant down on the couch and continued his search. (R. 40: 5). 
Because Robinson believed the residence to be "extremely cluttered," he requested 
a canine officer to come and do a sweep of the area. (R. 40: 6). Deputy Nielsen of the 
Utah County Sheriffs Office arrived with his canine. (R. 40: 6). Because of the 
cramped space, Deputy Nielsen asked Robinson to remove Defendant. (R. 40: 7). Both 
Robinson and Defendant waited outside of the residence as the canine performed its 
sweep. (R. 40: 7). 
The canine made an initial indication around the bed. (R. 40: 7). Nothing was 
found. (R. 40: 7). Deputy Nielsen and Officer Barker told Robinson that during a second 
sweep, after the canine indicated in the same area, the indication was "towards the ceiling 
of the shed." (R. 40: 7). Robinson was not present, but remained outside with 
Defendant. (R. 40: 7). 
Subsequently, Robinson testified that Officers Barker and Wolcott searched the 
top of the shed, which was covered in a tarp. (R. 40: 8). Robinson then stated that 
Wolcott reached through a slit in the tarp and retrieved a syringe, a small baggie with 
crystalline residue in it, and digital scales. (R. 40: 8). And also, next to the bed was a 
carburetor. (R. 40: 8). Robinson testified that the carburetor was taken apart and inside 
was a baggie that contained a baggie that contained crystalline substance in it. (R. 40: 8). 
Robinson testified that both substances field tested positive for methamphetamine. (R. 
40: 9). 
On cross-examination and re-direct, Robinson testified that he remained outside 
during these searches and did not personally observe them. (R. 40: 10, 14). Furthermore, 
defense counsel clarified that when Robinson testified about the tarp and carburetor 
4 
search he did not personally observe the searches, nor was he involved in removing the 
items from the location. (R. 40: 12). Also, Robinson did not perform the field tests, but 
observed Officer Barker perform them. (R. 40: 13). 
On re-direct, the State's attorney asked: 
MS. THOMAS - FISHBURN: Did you observe the search yourself- - were you 
able to see it from where your were standing with Mr. Valdez? 
MR. ROBINSON: Urn - - the third - - where the - -
MS. THOMAS - FISHBURN: The search with - -
MR. ROBINSON: - the items were actually found? 
MS. THOMAS -FISHBURN: Right. 
MR. ROBINSON: No. I was not. I did not observe it. 
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: Okay. The officers told you what they found. 
MR. ROBINSON: Yes. 
(R.40: 14). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
..A statement from a non-testifying officer to a testifying officer is reliable, but only 
so long as the statement originates among officers. And, to establish that the statement 
was passed between officers, there must be clear testimony from the testifying officer that 
the statement/information he is relaying originated from another officer. Here, the trial 
court correctly concluded that Agent Robinson's testimony was "unreliable" because the 
source of the information was never established. Therefore, because Agent Robinson's 
testimony was unreliable - in that that trial court did not find that the information came 
from another officer - the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that the hearsay 
testimony did not conform with Rule 1102(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Furthermore, the State failed to raise other Rule 1102 exceptions to hearsay that 
the trial court could have ruled on. Thus, these matters should not be addressed on 
Appeal. If, however, this Court concludes that other 1102 exceptions were properly 
raised, Defendant argues that they are not dispositive because they either do not apply or 
their unreliability is fatal. 
Additionally, because Agent Robinson's statements were "unreliable" hearsay, no 
independent bases of facts were presented at the preliminary hearing to satisfy the 
probable cause requirement. Without the hearsay, Agent Robinson's personal-knowledge 
statements only establish that he arrived at Defendant's home and that he remained 
outside with Defendant. Again, without the hearsay, Robinson cannot testify that a 
search was conducted which revealed contraband. As such, insufficient evidence was 
presented at the preliminary hearing for the trial court to conclude that a crime was 
committed and that Defendant committed it. 
Moreover, whether the trial court permitted the State to continue the hearing under 
1102(c) is a discretionary matter. The trial court acted appropriately, and within its 
authority, by not granting the State a continuance. And, by doing so is not evidence of 
the trial court's unreasonableness. 
Finally, defense counsel properly objected to the sufficiency of evidence at the 
preliminary hearing. Although defense counsel did not make a contemporaneous 
objection to the hearsay, it was clearly presented before the court and before final 
6 
judgment. Thus, the trial court was allowed to consider whether or not to take Agent 
Robinson's hearsay testimony into account. Therefore, the trial court acted appropriately 
by considering defense counsel's argument. 
ARGUMENT 
I. I he Ina i Court Correctly Concluded that the Agent's Testimony was 
"Unreliable" Hearsay under Rule 1102 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
Hearsay presented at a preliminary hearing is not presumptively admissible; rather 
it becomes admissible only by offering some quantum of reliability. See, Utah R. Evid. 
1102(b) (1999); State v. Rhinehart 2006 UT App 517, ^ 15 n. 5, 153 P.3d 830 (hearsay 
evidence is admissible at the preliminary hearing as long as that evidence is reliable). At 
the preliminary hearing, the State failed to present evidence that Agent Robinson's 
testimony qualified as an exception to the hearsay rule under Rule 1102 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence. Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded that the testimony was "not 
reliable hearsay." (R. 31). 
The State claims that this Court should review this hearsay issue "for correctness, 
without deference to the lower court's interpretation" because it involves the 
interpretation of evidentiary Rule 1102 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. (Appellant Br. at 
2). In State v. Rhinehart, 2005 UT App 517, this Court addressed whether the 
defendant's motion to quash the bindover should have been granted due to the improper 
admission of hearsay evidence at the preliminary hearing. There, this Court applied the 
following standard of review: 
[W]hen a case presents only a question of law, namely whether hearsay 
used at the preliminary hearing was admissible under Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), or 
reliable under rule 1102 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, this court will 
review the bindover determination for correctness giving no deference to 
the trial court. See State v. Graham, 2006 UT 43, ^  16 n. 7, 143 P.3d 268. 
Rhinehart 2006 UT App 517,18. 
In issuing this standard of reviewr as it relates to rule 1102, this court in Rhinehart 
cited the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Graham. However, Graham does not address 
rule 1102, nor the issue of reliable hearsay. Valdez therefore asserts that the standard set 
forth by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, 122 P.3d 639, is the 
more appropriate framework for review here: 
Our standard of review on the admissibility of hearsay evidence is complex, 
since the determination of admissibility "often contains a number of 
rulings, each of which may require a different standard of review." 
Norman H. Jackson, Utah Standards of Appellate Review, 12 Utah Bar J. 8, 
38 (1999). We review the legal questions to make the determination of 
admissibility for correctness. Hansen v. Hansen, 852 P.2d 977, 979 (Utah 
1993). We review the questions of fact for clear error. State v. Parker, 
2000 UT 51, Par 13, 4 P.3d 778. Finally, we review the district court's 
ruling on admissibility for abuse of discretion. Eggett v. Wasatch Energy 
Corp., 2004 UT 28, Par 10, 94 P.3d 193. 
Workman, 2005 UT 66, at \ 10. 
Valdez does not contest that "a statement of a non-testifying peace officer to a 
testifying peace officer" qualifies as reliable hearsay under rule 1102. Moreover, that 
issue is not what is at issue in this case. What is at issue in this case is purely a question 
of fact: Whether the information contained in the hearsay testimony of an officer came 
from a non-testifying officer. Because this issue involves purely a question of fact, it 
should be reviewed for clear error. 
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a. The State Failed to Present Evidence that the Hearsay Statements 
Came from a Fellow Peace Officer Under 1102(b)(6) 
"Out-of-court declarations offered for the truth of the matter asserted are 
nadmissible as hearsay unless they fit within one of the established exceptions to the 
learsay rule." State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah 1995). Rule 1102 of the Utah 
lules of Evidence delineate particular exceptions to the hearsay rule - particularly, Rule 
[102(b)(6), which states that "a statement from a non-testifying peace officer to a 
estifying peace officer" is reliable, and therefore, admissible hearsay. Utah R. Evid. 
[102(b)(6) (1999). Reliability, however, is the touchstone for admissible hearsay. 
"Exceptions to the hearsay rule are based on factors that provide assurances of 
estimonial reliability sufficient to dispense with the usual means of purging testimony of 
OTor and falsehood ...." State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah 1995). Apparently, the 
Jtah legislature has determined, via Rule 1102 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, that for 
mrposes of a preliminary hearing reliable hearsay is admissible. See, Utah R. Evid. 1102 
1999); Utah Const, art. 1, § 12; accord, State v. Rhinehart 2006 UT App 517, ffif 12-15, 
[53 P.3d 830. Hearsay proffered at a preliminary hearing is not presumptively reliable or 
idmissible, however. 
To be admissible, the proffered hearsay must be reliable. Rule 1102 delineates 
;everal hearsay exceptions and deems them reliable for the purposes of a preliminary 
rearing. For an out-of-court statement, offered for the truth of the matter, to be 
admissible under Rule 1102(b)(6), the statement must be from a non-testifying officer to 
the testifying officer. Utah R. Evid. 1102(b)(6) (1999). Thus, unless it is clear to the 
magistrate that the statement being made by the testifying officer originated from another 
officer, Rule 1102(b)(6) is inapplicable. 
Presently, the crux of the peace officer's (Agent Robinson) testimony illustrates 
the lack of reliability because he never identifies whether the source of his hearsay 
statements at issue here came from a fellow officer, nor does he testify with sufficient 
specificity that the drugs were found in the carburetor. Agent Robinson's testimony is as 
follows: 
STATE'S COUNSEL: As a result of that secondary search by the canine, what 
did you then do? 
MR. ROBINSON: Um - another - another search was conducted in that area. 
Officer Barker and Officer Wolcott - um - searched - um - basically the top of 
the shed is covered in a tarp and all kinds of hanging material and small objects. 
Um - there was a slit visible in the tarp. Um - Officer Wolcott reached up 
through the slit and retrieved a syringe, a small baggie with crystalline residue in 
it, and digital scales. Um - there - there was also an engine part, a carburetor 
actually laying right next to the bed. Um - the carburetor was taken apart, and 
inside, a piece of the carburetor was another baggie, a pink, reddish colored 
baggie. Um - it also had a crystalline substance in it. 
(R. 40: 8). Although Agent Robinson refers to Officers Wolcott and Barker and the 
search and discovery of paraphernalia, there is nothing indicating how and from whom 
Agent Robinson learned about the search of the carburetor and discovery of the baggie 
containing the crystalline substance. See, R. 40: 10-11. Thus, Agent Robinson learned 
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this information second hand, and for that information to be admitted under Rule 
1102(b)(6), it must be clear that it came from another officer. Agent Robinson was never 
clear about who told him about the carburetor search. Agent Robinson testified as to the 
other officers' search of the tarp on top of the shed; however, his hearsay testimony 
concerning the carburetor is not linked to 
Moreover, the State's re-direct of Agent Robinson on this matter never clarified 
who told whom about what. On re-direct, Agent Robinson admitted to not being present 
or observing the search. (R. 40: 14). He did, however acknowledge that "[t]he officers 
told [him] what they found." (R. 40:14). But, Agent Robinson did not specifically 
acknowledge what it was that the officers found. In conjunction with the previous 
testimony, the only specificity regarding the search was that the officers found a syringe, 
a small baggie and digital scales. Agent Robinson never clearly stated that the officers 
told him that they found a baggie after searching the carburetor. Thus, as the trial court 
observed, the "evidence was a step removed from hearsay and that the Court was asked to 
simply assume from the circumstances that some officer found the substance in a location 
that connected it to the Defendant." (R. 32). 
Specifically, in its ruling, the trial court predicated this factual finding on the 
following: 
Officer Robertson [sic] testified that "officer," told him that Officer Watcott 
reached into a slit in an overhead tarp above the bed and retrieved a syringe 
and a baggie with a very slight bit of what appeared to be drug residue. He 
also understood that someone identified and disassembled an automobile 
carburetor next to the bed and found a baggie with a larger amount of 
crystal substance. The Court has re-listed to the testimony and cannot 
determine that Officer Robertson [sic] identified who told him that the 
carburetor had been searched or who did the searching of the carburetor. 
Officer Robertson [sic] testified quite specifically that he did not observe 
either physical search following the K-9 sweeps and had no personal 
knowledge about who located what or where the items were located. 
(R. 33). While Agent Robinson acknowledged that the "officers" told him what they 
found, the trial court found this too vague of a statement to be reliable under Rule 
1102(b)(6). In this acknowledgment, Agent Robinson does not identify which officer 
told him what, nor does he indicate which officer searched the carburetor and found the 
baggie. As such, the trial court refused to assume that Agent Robinson's statements came 
from another agent. 
Moreover, Agent Robinson admitted to not being present, but relates the events of 
that day as if he personally witnessed them - particularly the carburetor search. To 
rectify this inconsistency, the State calls on this Court to make an assumption - that one 
of the officers that conducted the search told Agent Robinson about what occurred. 
However, it is not the court's job to assume that technicalities of hearsay exceptions are 
satisfied. At the preliminary hearing the State failed to elicit from Agent Robinson 
exactly who told him what. This matter could have been easily rectified by posing the 
question: "Agent Robinson, because you were not present during the searches, how did 
you learn of this information?" Consequently, the State failed to clarify the matter and 
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the trial court was left without a nexus between Agent Robinson's testimony and another 
officer. 
Also, the trial court acted within its discretion by concluding Agent Robinson's 
testimony was a uvague, unspecific presentation [and] not 'reliable hearsay.'" (R. 31). 
During cross-examination of Agent Robinson at the preliminary hearing, the State's 
attorney asked, and Agent Robinson confirmed, that he was not present, nor did he 
observe the searches. (R. 40: 14). Subsequently, the State's attorney stated, "[t]he 
officers told you what they found." And Agent Robinson replied, "Yes." (R. 40:14). 
Although its possible that the trial court could have inferred that "the officers" referred to 
Officers Barker, Wolcott or Deputy Nielsen, as a factual matter, the trial court found this 
insufficient. 
In a written ruling, the trial court reaffirmed that the Agent's testimony was 
unreliable. In the ruling, the trial court stated: 
In this case the State asked the Court to rely not on a specific declaration of 
a non-testifying officer but upon the assumption of Officer Robertson [sic] 
that information he had obtained came from one of the several officers who 
were there and found what was then field tested. This vague, unspecific 
presentation was not "reliable hearsay" and, without those inferences the 
testimony presented by the State was insufficient to meet the burden of 
proof required at a preliminary hearing. 
(R. 31). Valdez sides with the trial court that because Agent Robinson did not 
particularly identify which of the officers actually conveyed that information, the court 
was left to make an assumption. And, because the trial court was unwilling to make this 
assumption, insufficient indicia of reliability existed to conclude the testimony satisfied 
Rule 1102 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Conversely, the State contends that the trial court "did not correctly interpret or 
apply" Rule 1102(b)(6)'s "presumption of reliability and admissibility." (Appellant Br. 
at 12-14). The State bases this argument on the "fellow officer" rule, otherwise known as 
the "collective knowledge" doctrine. (Appellant Br. at 12). Although true, the State's 
application of this rule is misapplied. 
The State cites United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 
684 (1965), for the proposition that a finding of probable cause is "a practical, not 
abstract or technical, interpretation of facts" under the "fellow officer" rule. (Appellant 
Br. at 13). Although in Ventresca the Court states that a finding of probable cause, "like 
all constitutional requirements, are practical and not abstract[,]" the Court certainly did 
not disregard the importance of being technical when complying with the rules. U.S. v. 
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965). 
The technical aspect that must be satisfied for the "fellow officer" rule to apply, is 
that there must be a "substantial basis for crediting the hearsay." Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 
108. The State farther cites Ventresca for the principle that: 
Hearsay information . . . need not reflect the direct personal observations of 
the officer swearing to the information so long as the magistrate is informed 
of some of the underlying circumstances supporting the officer's 
conclusions and his belief that any person involved in providing the 
information whose identity need not be disclosed was credible or his 
information reliable. 
(Appellant Br. at 13) (quoting Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 107-08). According to the State, an 
officer's statements are presumptively reliable because there is an assumption that 
officers communicate to each other truthfully. (Appellant Br. at 14); See, State v. 
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Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1986). And as such, an officer's hearsay statements 
from another officer, offered at a preliminary hearing, are reliable. Valdez agrees with 
this proposition because it supports the underlying technicality - that the out-of-court 
statement came from another peace officer. 
Essentially, the State's argument on this point only substantiates the legislature's 
reasoning for allowing officers to give hearsay testimony. What the State's argument 
does not do is justify that merely because a hearsay statement is made by a testifying 
officer it should be presumptively reliable. As Rule 1102(b)(6) clearly points out, it is 
not just that the testifying person is a peace officer, but that the out-of-court statements he 
is repeating in court came from another officer. Here, Agent Robinson's testimony never 
identified the source of his information and thus the trial court "was asked to simply 
assume from the circumstances that some officer found the substance in a location that 
connected it to the Defendant." (R. 32) (emphasis in original). The State failed to bridge 
the gap between the events Agent Robinson testified to and who told him about the 
events. 
Therefore, because Agent Robinson did not identify who told him about the 
search, Rule 1102(b)(6) is inapplicable and the trial court ruled correctly. 
b. Rule 1102(b)(3) is Inapplicable Because the Hearsay was Not Proffered 
to Establish the Foundation or the Authenticity of an Exhibit 
First, the State has failed to preserve a Rule 1102(b)(3) issue for appeal and thus it 
should not be considered. The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that: 
In order to preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be presented to the 
trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on 
that issue. This requirement puts the trial judge on notice of the asserted 
error and allows for correction at that time in the course of the proceeding. 
For a trial court to be afforded an opportunity to correct the error (1) the 
issue must be raised in a timely fashion, (2) the issue must be specifically 
raised, and (3) the challenging party must introduce supporting evidence or 
relevant legal authority. 
438 Main Street v. Easy Heat. Inc.. 2004 UT 72, % 51, 99 P.3d 801. Here, the record is 
devoid of anything regarding Rule 1102(b)(3) that the trial court ruled on. Therefore, this 
Court should not consider the State's argument. If this Court finds, however, that the 
issue was properly raised, Valdez asserts that Rule 1102(b)(3) is inapplicable. 
While Rule 1102(b)(3) indicates that hearsay is reliable for the purpose of 
establishing foundation for or the authenticity of any exhibit, this rule is inapplicable 
here. Utah R. Evid. 1102(b)(3) (1999). Under these facts Rule 1102(b)(3) is clearly 
inapplicable because Agent Robinson's testimony was not given for the purpose of 
foundation or authenticity of an exhibit. The State's argument supports that conclusion. 
(Appellate Br. at 17) ("As it happened, no foundation was needed in this preliminary 
hearing because the baggie was not introduced into evidence."). 
Additionally, the State misapplies the purpose behind the rule. As Rule 
1102(b)(3) clearly states, such hearsay is reliable and therefore admissible at a 
preliminary hearing for the purpose of creating foundation or authenticating an exhibit. 
Utah R. Evid. 1102(b)(3) (1999). As the Advisory Committee Notes indicate, such 
hearsay is admissible only as to exhibits; "[f]or example, proving the chain of custody for 
controlled substances may be accomplished under this section without calling the 
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witnesses in the chain." Utah R. Evid. 1102(b)(3) (1999) Advisory Committee Notes. 
No such circumstance exists here. Therefore, Rule 1102(b)(3) does not apply. 
c. 1102(b)(1) Present Sense Impression does Permit the Introduction of 
Facts Because the Perceiving Party is Unidentified 
First, the State has failed to preserve a Rule 1102(b)(1) issue for appeal and thus it 
should not be considered. The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that: 
In order to preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be presented to the 
trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on 
that issue. This requirement puts the trial judge on notice of the asserted 
error and allows for correction at that time in the course of the proceeding. 
For a trial court to be afforded an opportunity to correct the error (1) the 
issue must be raised in a timely fashion, (2) the issue must be specifically 
raised, and (3) the challenging party must introduce supporting evidence or 
relevant legal authority. 
438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ^ 51, 99 P.3d 801. Here, the record is 
devoid of anything regarding Rule 1102(b)(1) that the trial court considered. Therefore, 
this Court should not consider the State's argument. If this Court finds, however, that the 
issue was properly raised, Valdez asserts that Rule 1102(b)(1) is inapplicable. 
As the State correctly points out, Rule 1102(b)(1) deems hearsay reliable for the 
purposes of a preliminary hearing if it would be admissible under the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. (Appellate Br. at 18); Utah R. Evid. 1102(b)(1) (1999). According to the 
State, Agent Robinson's testimony is reliable hearsay under Rule 803(1) Present Sense 
Impression. Id. Present Sense Impression, however, would not permit the introduction 
of hearsay evidence that Agent Robinson did not personally perceive. 
A present sense impression is "[a] statement describing or explaining an event or 
condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately 
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thereafter." Utah R. Evid. 803(1) (2004). Here, there are two conditions of the Rule 
803(1) present sense impression that are fatal to its applicability. 
First, Rule 803(1) requires that the declarant had made the statement either while 
perceiving the event or immediately thereafter. Utah R. Evid. 803(1) (2004). Nothing in 
the record indicates that the perceiving officer's statement was made while perceiving the 
event or immediately thereafter. As explained in the Advisory Committee Notes of the 
Federal Rules1, "[t]he underlying theory of Exception [for presence sense impression] is 
that substantial contemporaneity of event and statement negate the likelihood of 
deliberate or conscious misrepresentation." Fed. R. Evid. 803; see also, State v. 
Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 700 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (finding that because the statements 
were made while the declarant perceived the events, the statement was admissible); 
United States v. Manfre, 368 F.3d 832, 840 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding that too much time 
had elapsed between the event and the statements); State v. Tucker, 68 P.3d 110, 118-19 
(Ariz. 2003) (recognizing that u[t]he more time that elapses between the event and the 
statement, the stronger the possibility that a declarant will attempt, either consciously or 
subconsciously, to alter his or her description of the event."). There is nothing in the 
record as to how much time had elapsed between the event, as perceived by the officers, 
and the statement to Agent Robinson. As such, a proper inquiry into the matter is 
impossible and therefore Rule 803(1) is inapplicable. 
1
 Rule 803 of the Utah Rules of Evidence uis the federal rule verbatim." Utah R. Evid. 
803, Advisory Committee Note. 
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Second, Agent Robinson never indicated who made the present sense impression 
statements that he repeated at the preliminary hearing. One of the elements of a 
statement being admitted as a present sense impression is that "the declarant must have 
personally perceived the event described...." United States v. Mitchell 145 F.3d 572, 
576 (3rd Cir. 1998). In Mitchell, the Court of Appeals rejected the admissibility of out-
of-court statements describing an event where the declarant was anonymous. Mitchell 
involved officers investigating the robbery of a armored truck and the admissibility of an 
anonymous note regarding information about the get-away cars. Mitchell, 145 F.3d at 
574-75. 
Reflecting on an earlier decision, the Third Circuit reiterated that "'a party seeking 
to introduce an anonymous statement carries a burden heavier than where the declarant is 
identified to demonstrate the statement's circumstantial trustworthiness.'" Mitchell 145 
F.3d at 576 (citing Miller v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507, 510 (3rd Cir. 1985)). This went to 
the heart of whether the declarant personally perceived the event. And because the 
record was "devoid of circumstances indicating by preponderance that the author of the 
anonymous note actually saw Mitchell change cars" the Court of Appeals reversed the 
trial court and held that the present sense impression hearsay exception was not satisfied. 
Mitchell, 145F.3dat577. 
Similarly here, the State presented no evidence as to who made the statements 
Agent Robinson repeated in court that would satisfy the requirement that "the declarant 
must have personally perceived the event described." Mitchell, 145 F.3d at 576. This is 
precisely what the trial court reasoned: 
In this case [ ] Officer Robertson didn't specifically recite any statements of 
a non-testifying officer about the larger baggie found in the carburetor. 
While the testimony was specific about Officer Watcott reaching into the 
tear in the overhead tarp, the smaller baggie and syringe, by themselves, 
contain insufficient quantities to establish the felony charge. Officer 
Robertson was unable to stat who searched the carburetor or who found the 
larger baggie of suspected drugs. The view of the Court at the time of the 
preliminary hearing, and now, is that this evidence was a step removed 
from hearsay and that the Court was asked to simply assume from the 
circumstances that some officer found the substance in a location that 
connected it to the Defendant. 
(R. 32) (emphasis in original). Agent Robinson never indicated who made the statements 
that he repeated in court; thus, making the original statements anonymous. See, U.S v. 
Mitchell, 145 F.3d 572 (3rd Cir. 1998). 
Therefore, because Agent Robinson did not sufficiently identify which officer, if 
any, made the statements he repeated in court, the source is anonymous and the thus 
unreliable hearsay under Rule 1102(b)(2). 
d. There was Insufficient Indicia of Reliability for the Trial Court to have 
Determined the Agent's Hearsay Statements Complied with Rule 
1102(b)(9) 
First, the State has failed to preserve a Rule 1102(b)(9) issue for appeal and thus it 
should not be considered. The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that: 
In order to preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be presented to the 
trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on 
that issue. This requirement puts the trial judge on notice of the asserted 
error and allows for correction at that time in the course of the proceeding. 
For a trial court to be afforded an opportunity to correct the error (1) the 
issue must be raised in a timely fashion, (2) the issue must be specifically 
raised, and (3) the challenging party must introduce supporting evidence or 
relevant legal authority. 
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438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, U 51, 99 P.3d 801. Here, the record is 
devoid of anything regarding Rule 1102(b)(9) that the trial court ruled on. Therefore, this 
Court should not consider the State's argument. If this Court finds, however, that the 
issue was properly raised, Valdez asserts that Rule 1102(b)(9) is inapplicable. 
The State claims that "even if the hearsay statements] were 'one step removed' 
from this traditional hearsay exception, subsection (b)(9) of rule 1102 would still deem 
the statement admissible at preliminary hearing if it had 'similar indicia of reliability.'" 
(Appellant Br. at 18); Utah R. Evid 1102(b)(9) (1999) ("other hearsay evidence with 
similar indicia of reliability"). The State's conclusion that "indicia of reliability exist 
given the testifying agent's own observations of the large baggie after the officers 
emerged from the shed and the agent's personal knowledge that the carburetor was next 
to the Defendant's bed[]" omits a necessary nexus. (Appellant Br. at 18). 
Although he testified from personal knowledge that a carburetor was located in 
Valdez's shed, Agent Robinson never conducted nor even witnessed the alleged search of 
the carburetor (R. 40: 13-14). Thus, for the trial court to bridge that nexus between 
Agent Robinson's knowledge of the existence of the carburetor and the contraband, it 
would have to rely on the hearsay testimony regarding the search. However, as the trial 
court concluded, Agent Robinson never revealed who told him what about the search. 
(R. 31). Therefore, because the source of the information is in question, there is no 
indicia of reliability that the trial court determined that it could rely on to make the 
connection the State calls for. 
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In sum, because the trial court correctly concluded that Agent Robinson's 
testimony lacked reliability (R. 31), there is no indication that the court was clearly 
erroneous in its factual determination. See, State v. Allred, 2002 UT App 291, ^  10; and 
State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51,1 13. 
II. The Trial Court Acted Appropriately in Concluding that the State Failed 
to Present Sufficient Evidence for Bindover 
The purpose of a preliminary hearing is for the magistrate to determine whether 
"the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it[.]" Utah 
R. Crim. P. 7(i)(2) (2005). The Utah Supreme Court has clearly stated that the probable 
cause standard for a preliminary hearing "is the same as the probable cause that the 
prosecution must show to obtain an arrest warrant[.]" State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, f^ 18. 
As such, the "prosecution must present sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief 
... while still allowing magistrates to fulfill the primary purpose of the preliminary 
hearing, ferreting out groundless and improvident prosecutions." State v. Virgin, 2006 
UT 29, f 18 (internal citation and quotations omitted). 
Here, the State erroneously contends that even without Agent Robinson's hearsay 
testimony, sufficient evidence existed to establish probable cause for bindover. 
(Appellant Br. 20). Without Agent Robinson's hearsay statements, the only possible way 
for the trial court to have found probable cause was based on Robinson's personal 
knowledge. Agent Robinson's personal testimony, however, was seriously deficient and 
does not rise to the level of probable cause. 
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The only personal-knowledge testimony elicited from Robinson regarding the 
contraband was that he was present when a field test was conducted. (R. 40: 12). Agent 
Robinson never testified that he personally observed the search that revealed the 
contraband. Omitting the remaining hearsay testimony - that officers searched the 
carburetor and discovered a baggie with some crystalline substance - demonstrates that 
Agent Robinson's personal-knowledge testimony alone only proves that contraband was 
found and not that it was found in Valdez's shed or in his possession. (R. 40: 8). In 
order for the trial court to conclude that the contraband was discovered inside the 
carburetor is to rely on the hearsay. 
Furthermore, without the hearsay statements, the trial court could not make any 
reasonable inferences that a crime was committed and that Defendant committed it. See, 
Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i)(2) (2005). The State contends that "the magistrate 'may only 
disregard or discredit evidence that is wholly lacking and incapable of creating a 
reasonable inference regarding a portion of the prosecution's claim.'" (Appellate Br. at 
19) (quoting State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ^ 24) (internal quotations omitted). Although 
true, in order for the magistrate to even consider the statements, they must be accepted as 
evidence. See, State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah 1981) (holding that a 
defendant is "entitled to a determination by the court of the evidence's constitutional 
admissibility; and once admissible, it may be presented to the fact-finder). Because the 
trial court found the statements from Agent Robinson to be unreliable hearsay (R. 31) and 
therefore inadmissible, there can be no inferences from which the trial court could have 
inferred "in the prosecution's favor." (Appellant Br. at 19). 
While Agent Robinson's personal-knowledge testimony may have established that 
a crime was committed - the positive field test for contraband that he witnessed - without 
the hearsay statements, nothing ties the contraband to Valdez. See, State v. Virgin, 2006 
UT 29, ^ f 18. Therefore, the trial court acted appropriately by not granting the bindover. 
a. Regardless of Hearsay Objections, Continuances under Rule 1102(c)(1) 
are Permissive, and Not Granted as a Matter of Right 
Subsection (c) of Rule 1102 states that: "If hearsay evidence is proffered or 
admitted in the preliminary examination, a continuance of the hearing may be granted for 
the purpose of furnishing additional evidence if: (1) The magistrate finds that the hearsay 
evidence proffered or admitted is not sufficient and additional evidence is necessary for a 
bindover[.]" Utah R. Evid. 1102 (c) (1999) (emphasis added). The State argues that trial 
court's refusal to grant a continuance so that other officers could be called to testify was 
"unreasonable, given the lack of a timely objection to the admission of the hearsayf]" and 
despite no prior continuances had been granted. (Appellant Br. at 20-21). The trial 
court's decision not to permit the State's continuance, however, was not unreasonable. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated that "[i]t is well established in Utah, as elsewhere, 
that the granting of a continuance is at the discretion of the trial judge, whose decision 
will not be reversed by this Court absent a clear abuse of that discretion." State v. 
Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982). At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, 
after the State had moved for a continuance to call additional testimony, the trial court 
held: 
24 
I'm not going to move the prelim. That was a bad choice, counsel. You 
know, probable cause can be established on hearsay ... [b]ut this one - all 
I've got is the officer's received report from someone who said that 
someone was buying from the defendant. He went to the location, didn't 
find anything himself. He stepped outside, and then I have a report that an 
officer found some drugs. I don't have any direct testimony that the drugs 
were located. Um - this one falls short. 
(R. 40: 16-17). The trial court determined that counsel for the State made a poor tactical 
decision and, implicitly, ruled against a continuance because it would not be judicially 
efficient to permit a continuance under these circumstances. Therefore, the trial court did 
not clearly abuse his discretion under Rule 1102(c)(1) by denying a continuance. 
b. Untimeliness Does Not Affect the Trial Court's Responsibility of 
Determining Reliability of the Hearsay Testimony 
The State cites Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984), for the 
proposition that because defense counsel did not make a hearsay objection at the time of 
Agent Robinson's testimony, that it was untimely and the trial court should not have 
entertained the objection post-testimony. (Appellant Br. at 21). Whether defense counsel 
made the objection contemporaneous to the hearsay testimony or before judgment, the 
objection was proper and the trial court appropriately considered it. 
In Barson, the Utah Supreme Court held that 
Where there was no clear and definite objection on the basis of hearsay, 
that theory cannot now be raised on appeal. [Appellant] did raise a hearsay 
objection after judgment was entered in the case. However, issues raised for 
the first time in post-judgment motions are raised too late to be reviewed on 
appeal. Therefore, we are precluded from addressing this assertion of error 
on the merits. 
i s 
Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 682 P.2d 832, 837 (Utah 1984). Barson actually supports 
Valdez's position that defense counsel made a timely objection for the trial court to 
properly consider. 
First, Barson indicates that there must be a "clear and definite objection on the 
basis of hearsay[.j" Barson, 682 P.2d at 837. Defense counsel's objection was clear and 
definite. After Agent Robinson's testimony, defense counsel objected to the testimony as 
insufficient to establish probable cause because there was no direct evidence. (R. 40: 15-
16). Defense counsel's objection was clear enough that the trial court recognized the 
insufficiency of evidence was based on hearsay and ruled accordingly. This is in line 
with Barson. 
Second, Barson holds that for a hearsay objection to be raised on appeal, it cannot 
be raised post-judgment. Barson, 682 P.2d at 837. Defense counsel's objection was 
made pre-judgment. At the conclusion of testimony, although not contemporaneous with 
it, defense counsel made its objection regarding the agent's hearsay. This too complies 
with Barson. 
Furthermore, the State contends that it was the responsibility of defense counsel or 
the magistrate to have "asked Agent Robinson to identify which officer discovered the 
large baggie or informed him of its discovery...." (Appellant Br. 21). Contrary to the 
State's belief, it is not the responsibility of either defense counsel or the magistrate to 
correct the State's evidentiary deficiencies. See, State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 407 
(Utah 1989) (holding that "the burden is on the party proffering the evidence to 
demonstrate that it has the requisite degree of reliability."). 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the aforementioned reasons, Valdez respectfully requests that this court affirm 
the trial court's refusal to bind over based on insufficiency of evidence. 
Respectfully submitted this ? r ofiyr 2009 
Margaret P. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellee, 
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.+ RULE 1102. RELIABLE HEARSAY IN CRIMINAL PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS 
(a) Statement of the Rule.Reliable hearsay is admissible at criminal preliminary examinations. 
(b) Definition of Reliable Hearsay.For purposes of criminal preliminary examinations only, reliable hearsay in-
cludes: 
(1) hearsay evidence admissible at trial under the Utah Rules of Evidence; 
(2) hearsay evidence admissible at trial under Rule 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, regardless of the avail-
ability of the declarant at the preliminary examination; 
(3) evidence establishing the foundation for or the authenticity of any exhibit; 
(4) scientific, laboratory, or forensic reports and records; 
(5) medical and autopsy reports and records; 
(6) a statement of a non-testifying peace officer to a testifying peace officer; 
(7) a statement made by a child victim of physical abuse or a sexual offense which is promptly,reported by the 
child victim and recorded in accordance with Rule 15.5 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; 
(8) a statement of a declarant that is written, recorded, or transcribed verbatim which is: 
(A) under oath or affirmation; or 
(B) pursuant to a notification to the declarant that a false statement made therein is punishable. 
(9) other hearsay evidence with similar indicia of reliability, regardless of admissibility at trial under Rules 
803 and 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(c) Continuance for Production of Additional Evidence.If hearsay evidence is proffered or admitted in the 
preliminary examination, a continuance of the hearing may be granted for the purpose of furnishing additional 
evidence if: 
(1) The magistrate finds that the hearsay evidence proffered or admitted is not sufficient and additional evid-
ence is necessary for a bindover; or 
(2) The defense establishes that it would be so substantially and unfairly disadvantaged by the use of the 
hearsay evidence as to outweigh the interests of the declarant and the efficient administration of justice. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CO 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
State of Utah, 
Ruling 
Plaintiff : 
vs. : Date: October 9,2008 
Jesse Valdez, : Case Number: 081402004 
Defendant : Division VII: Judge James R. Taylor 
This matter comes before the Court on the State's motion for reconsideration of this 
Court's ruling that the State failed to meet its burden of proof at the preliminary hearing held 
August 28, 2008. 
The State relied upon a single witness at the preliminary hearing. Probation Officer Curt 
Robertson testified that he had received "numerous" calls from other law enforcement agencies 
complaining that Mr. Valdez was involved in selling narcotics. As the agent assigned to Mr. 
Valdez, Mr. Robertson went with several Provo police officers to the shed where Mr. Valdez 
lived at 1 a.m. on July 12, 2008. After several knocks Mr. Valdez came to the door and let 
Officer Robertson in. Mr. Valdez, himself, was searched and nothing was found. A couch was 
searched and nothing was found. Nothing was found during a quick search of the interior of the 
shed although the place was extremely cluttered with hundreds of nooks, crannies and 
automobile parts in which drugs could be hidden. Officer Robertson requested a canine search. 
Deputy Nielson, a K-9 officer for the Utah County Sheriffs Office arrived. Officer Robertson 
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was asked to take Mr. Valdez outside while the dog searched. Deputy Nielson came out and 
reported that the dog alerted on an area near the bed. 
Officers other than Officer Robertson searched while Robertson remained outside with 
Valdez. Nothing was found. The dog conducted another search and Deputy Nielson reported 
that the dog seemed to be interested in something "higher." Provo officers Barker and Watcott 
re-entered the shed and searched again. Officer Robertson did not observe the search. 
Officer Robertson testified that "officers," told him that Officer Watcott reached into a 
slit in an overhead tarp above the bed and retrieved a syringe and a baggie with a very slight bit 
of what appeared to be drug residue. He also understood that someone identified and 
disassembled an automobile carburetor next to the bed and found a baggie with a larger amount 
of crystal substance. The Court has re-listened to the testimony and cannot determine that 
Officer Robertson identified who told him that the carburetor had been searched or who did the 
searching of the carburetor. Officer Robertson testified quite specifically that he did not observe 
either physical search following the K-9 sweeps and had no personal knowledge about who 
located what or where the items were located. Both baggies were field tested and a positive 
result for methamphetamine was received. 
Rule 1102 allows the use of reliable hearsay at criminal preliminary hearings. Reliable 
hearsay is defined at 1102(b)(6) as "a statement of a non-testifying peace officer to a testifying 
peace officer." In this case, however, Officer Robertson didn't specifically recite any statements 
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of a non-testifying officer about the larger baggie found in the carburetor. While the testimony 
was specific about Officer Watcott reaching into the tear in the overhead tarp, the smaller baggie 
and syringe, by themselves, contained insufficient quantities to establish the felony charge. 
Officer Robertson was unable to state who searched the carburetor or who found the larger 
baggie of suspected drugs. The view of the Court at the time of the preliminary hearing, and 
now, is that this evidence was a step removed from hearsay and that the Court was asked to 
simply assume from the circumstances that some officer found the substance in a location that 
connected it to the Defendant. 
It has long been the tradition, in Utah Courts, to protect the basic right to confront 
witnesses at a preliminary hearing. In State v. Anderson, 612 P2d 778 at 786 (Utah, 1980) the 
Court noted: 
. . . the ancillary benefits inherent in this preliminary proceeding, 
e.g., the various aspects of discovery incident to the pretrial 
examination of prosecution witnesses, would be seriously curtailed 
by denying the defendant a right of confrontation at the hearing. 
This curtailment would infringe upon the defendant's right to a fair 
trial, by denying him the opportunity to prepare an effective defense. 
For example, the cross-examination of witnesses at this 
preliminary stage in a criminal prosecution provides the defendant 
an opportunity to attack their testimony before it becomes 
immutable by repetition and the influence, however legitimate, of 
the prosecution. Also, favorable testimony will often be elicited 
from the cross-examination of the witnesses at the preliminary 
examination and contradictory statements made at the hearing may 
subsequently become important as tools for attacking the 
credibility of the witnesses at the actual trial. 
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The specific prohibition from Anderson on the use of hearsay testimony at a preliminary 
hearing has been overturned by amendment to the Utah Constitution in 1996 (Article 1, Section 
12) and the adoption of Rule 1102, Utah Rules of Evidence in 1995. But the fundamental 
purpose of preliminary hearings remains unaltered. In this case the State asked the Court to rely 
not on a specific declaration of a non-testifying officer but upon the assumption of Officer 
Robertson that information he had obtained came from one of several officers who were there 
and found what was then field tested. This vague, unspecific presentation was not "reliable 
hearsay" and, without those inferences the testimony presented by the State was insufficient to 
meet the burden of proof required at a preliminary hearing. 
The Court respectfully declines to modify its previous ruling. 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
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